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Abstract
We present many new results related to reliable (interactive) communication over insertion-
deletion channels. Synchronization errors, such as insertions and deletions, strictly generalize
the usual symbol corruption errors and are much harder to protect against.
We show how to hide the complications of synchronization errors in many applications by
introducing very general channel simulations which efficiently transform an insertion-deletion
channel into a regular symbol corruption channel with an error rate larger by a constant factor
and a slightly smaller alphabet. We utilize and generalize synchronization string based methods
which were recently introduced as a tool to design essentially optimal error correcting codes
for insertion-deletion channels. Our channel simulations depend on the fact that, at the cost
of increasing the error rate by a constant factor, synchronization strings can be decoded in
a streaming manner that preserves linearity of time. Interestingly, we provide a lower bound
showing that this constant factor cannot be improved to 1 + ε, in contrast to what is achiev-
able for error correcting codes. Our channel simulations drastically and cleanly generalize the
applicability of synchronization strings.
We provide new interactive coding schemes which simulate any interactive two-party protocol
over an insertion-deletion channel. Our results improve over the interactive coding schemes of
Braverman et al. [8] and Sherstov and Wu [30] which achieve a small constant rate and require
exponential time computations with respect to computational and communication complexities.
We provide the first computationally efficient interactive coding schemes for synchronization
errors, the first coding scheme with a rate approaching one for small noise rates, and also the first
coding scheme that works over arbitrarily small alphabet sizes. We also show tight connections
between synchronization strings and edit-distance tree codes which allow us to transfer results
from tree codes directly to edit-distance tree codes.
Finally, using on our channel simulations, we provide an explicit low-rate binary insertion-
deletion code that improves over the state-of-the-art codes by Guruswami and Wang [18] in
terms of rate-distance trade-off.
∗Supported in part by NSF grants CCF-1527110, CCF-1618280 and NSF CAREER award CCF-1750808.
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1 Introduction
Communication in the presence of synchronization errors, which include both insertions and dele-
tions, is a fundamental problem of practical importance which eluded a strong theoretical foun-
dation for decades. This remained true even while communication in the presence of half-errors,
which consist of symbol corruptions and erasures, has been the subject of an extensive body of
research with many groundbreaking results. Synchronization errors are strictly more general than
half-errors, and thus synchronization errors pose additional challenges for robust communication.
In this work, we show that one-way and interactive communication in the presence of synchro-
nization errors can be reduced to the problem of communication in the presence of half-errors.
We present a series of efficient channel simulations which allow two parties to communicate over
a channel afflicted by synchronization errors as though they were communicating over a half-error
channel with only a slightly larger error rate. This allows us to leverage existing coding schemes for
robust communication over half-error channels in order to derive strong coding schemes resilient to
synchronization errors.
One of the primary tools we use are synchronization strings, which were recently introduced by
Haeupler and Shahrasbi in order to design essentially optimal error correcting codes (ECCs) robust
to synchronization errors [21]. For every ε > 0, synchronization strings allow a sender to index a
sequence of messages with an alphabet of size ε−O(1) in such a way that k synchronization errors
are efficiently transformed into (1 + ε)k half-errors for the purpose of designing ECCs. Haeupler
and Shahrasbi provide a black-box construction which transforms any ECC into an equally efficient
ECC robust to synchronization errors. However, channel simulations and interactive coding in the
presence of synchronization errors present a host of additional challenges that cannot be solved by
the application of an ECC. Before we describe our results and techniques in detail, we begin with
an overview of the well-known interactive communication model.
Interactive communication. Throughout this work, we study a scenario where there are two
communicating parties, whom we call Alice and Bob. The two begin with some input symbols
and wish to compute a function of their input by having a conversation. Their goal is to succeed
with high probability while communicating as few symbols as possible. In particular, if their
conversation would consist of n symbols in the noise-free setting, then they would like to converse
for at most αn symbols, for some small α, when in the presence of noise. One might hope that
Alice and Bob could correspond using error-correcting codes. However, this approach would lead
to poor performance because if a party incorrectly decodes a single message, then the remaining
communication is rendered useless. Therefore, only a very small amount of noise could be tolerated,
namely less than the amount to corrupt a single message.
There are three major aspects of coding schemes for interactive communication that have been
extensively studied in the literature. The first is the coding scheme’s maximum tolerable error-
fraction or, in other words, the largest fraction of errors for which the coding scheme can suc-
cessfully simulate any given error-free protocol. Another important quality of coding schemes for
interactive communication, as with one-way communication, is communication rate, i.e., the
amount of communication overhead in terms of the error fraction. Finally, the efficiency of inter-
active coding schemes have been of concern in the previous work.
Schulman initiated the study of error-resilient interactive communication, showing how to con-
vert an arbitrary two-party interactive protocol to one that is robust to a δ = 1/240 fraction of
adversarial errors with a constant communication overhead [25,26]. Braverman and Rao increased
the bound on the tolerable adversarial error rate to δ < 1/4, also with a constant communication
overhead [9]. Brakerski et al. [2] designed the first efficient coding scheme resilient to a constant frac-
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tion of adversarial errors with constant communication overhead. The above-mentioned schemes
achieve a constant overhead no matter the level of noise. Kol and Raz were the first to study
the trade-off between error fraction and communication rate [24]. Haeupler then provided a cod-
ing scheme with a communication rate of 1− O(√δ log log(1/δ)) over an adversarial channel [19].
Further prior work has studied coding for interactive communication focusing on communication
efficiency and noise resilience [7,15,20] as well as computational efficiency [2–4,13–15]. Other works
have studied variations of the interactive communication problem [1,5, 11,12,16].
The main challenge that synchronization errors pose is that they may cause the parties to
become “out of sync.” For example, suppose the adversary deletes a message from Alice and
inserts a message back to her. Neither party will know that Bob is a message behind, and if this
corruption remains undetected, the rest of the communication will be useless. In most state-of-the-
art interactive coding schemes for symbol corruptions, the parties communicate normally for a fixed
number of rounds and then send back and forth a series of checks to detect any symbol corruptions
that may have occurred. One might hope that a synchronization error could be detected during
these checks, but the parties may be out of sync while performing the checks, thus rendering them
useless as well. Therefore, synchronization errors require us to develop new techniques.
Very little is known regarding coding for interactive communication in the presence of synchro-
nization errors. A 2016 coding scheme by Braverman et al. [8], which can be seen as the equivalent
of Schulman’s seminal result, achieves a small constant communication rate while being robust
against a 1/18 − ε fraction of errors. The coding scheme relies on edit-distance tree codes, which
are a careful adaptation of Schulman’s original tree codes [26] for edit distance, so the decoding
operations are not efficient and require exponential time computations. A recent work by Sher-
stov and Wu [30] closed the gap for maximum tolerable error fraction by introducing a coding
scheme that is robust against 1/6 − ε fraction of errors which is the highest possible fraction of
insertions and deletions under which any coding scheme for interactive communication can work.
Both Braverman et al. [8] and Sherstov and Wu [30] schemes are of constant communication rate,
over large enough constant alphabets, and inefficient. In this work we address the next natural
questions which, as arose with ordinary corruption interactive communication, are on finding inter-
active coding schemes that are computationally efficient or achieve super-constant communication
efficiency.
1.1 Our results
We present very general channel simulations which allow two parties communicating over an
insertion-deletion channel to follow any protocol designed for a regular symbol corruption channel.
The fraction of errors on the simulated symbol corruption channel is only slightly larger than that
on the insertion-deletion channel. Our channel simulations are made possible by synchronization
strings. Crucially, at the cost of increasing the error rate by a constant factor, synchronization
strings can be decoded in a streaming manner which preserves linearity of time. Note that the
similar technique is used in Haeupler and Shahrasbi [21] to transform synchronization errors into
ordinary symbol corruptions as a stepping-stone to obtain insertion-deletion codes from ordinary
error correcting codes in a black-box fashion. However, in the context of error correcting codes,
there is no requirement for this transformation to happen in real time. In other words, in the study
of insertion-deletion codes by Haeupler and Shahrasbi [21], the entire message transmission is done
and then the receiving party uses the entire message to transform the synchronization errors into
symbol corruptions. In the channel simulation problem, this transformation is required to happen
on the fly. Interestingly, we have found out that in the harder problem of channel simulation, the
factor by which the number of synchronization errors increase by being transformed into corrup-
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tion errors cannot be improved to 1 + o(1), in contrast to what is achievable for error correcting
codes. This work exhibits the widespread applicability of synchronization strings and opens up sev-
eral new use cases, such as coding for interactive communication over insertion-deletion channels.
Namely, using synchronization strings, we provide techniques to obtain the following simulations of
corruption channels over given insertion-deletion channels with binary and large constant alphabet
sizes.
Theorem 1.1. (Informal Statement of Theorems 3.3, 3.5, 3.11, and 3.13)
(a) Suppose that n rounds of a one-way/interactive insertion-deletion channel over an alphabet
Σ with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. Using an ε-synchronization string
over an alphabet Σsyn, it is possible to simulate n (1−Oε(δ)) rounds of a one-way/interactive
corruption channel over Σsim with at most Oε (nδ) symbols corrupted so long as |Σsim| ×
|Σsyn| ≤ |Σ|.
(b) Suppose that n rounds of a binary one-way/interactive insertion-deletion channel with a δ
fraction of insertions and deletions are given. It is possible to simulate n(1−Θ(√δ log(1/δ)))
rounds of a binary one-way/interactive corruption channel with Θ(
√
δ log(1/δ)) fraction of
corruption errors between two parties over the given channel.
Based on the channel simulations presented above, we present novel interactive coding schemes
which simulate any interactive two-party protocol over an insertion-deletion channel.
We use our large alphabet interactive channel simulation along with constant-rate efficient cod-
ing scheme of Ghaffari and Haeupler [15] for interactive communication over corruption channels
to obtain a coding scheme for insertion-deletion channels that is efficient, has a constant commu-
nication rate, and tolerates up to 1/44 − ε fraction of errors. Note that despite the fact that this
coding scheme fails to protect against the optimal 1/6− ε fraction of synchronization errors as the
recent work by Sherstov and Wu [30] does, it is an improvement over all previous work in terms
of computational efficiency as it is the first efficient coding scheme for interactive communication
over insertion-deletion channels.
Theorem 1.2. For any constant ε > 0 and n-round alternating protocol Π, there is an efficient
randomized coding scheme simulating Π in presence of δ = 1/44 − ε fraction of edit-corruptions
with constant rate (i.e., in O(n) rounds) and in O(n5) time that works with probability 1 − 2Θ(n).
This scheme requires the alphabet size to be a large enough constant Ωε(1).
Next, we use our small alphabet channel simulation and the corruption channel interactive
coding scheme of Haeupler [19] to introduce an interactive coding scheme for insertion-deletion
channels. This scheme is not only computationally efficient, but also the first with super constant
communication rate. In other words, this is the first coding scheme for interactive communication
over insertion-deletion channels whose rate approaches one as the error fraction drops to zero. Our
computationally efficient interactive coding scheme achieves a near-optimal communication rate
of 1 − O(√δ log(1/δ)) and tolerates a δ fraction of errors. Besides computational efficiency and
near-optimal communication rate, this coding scheme improves over all previous work in terms of
alphabet size. As opposed to coding schemes provided by the previous work [8, 30], our scheme
does not require a large enough constant alphabet and works even for binary alphabets.
Theorem 1.3. For sufficiently small δ, there is an efficient interactive coding scheme for fully
adversarial binary insertion-deletion channels which is robust against δ fraction of edit-corruptions,
achieves a communication rate of 1−Θ(√δ log(1/δ)), and works with probability 1− 2−Θ(nδ).
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We also utilize the channel simulations in one-way settings to provide efficient binary insertion-
deletion codes correcting δ-fraction of synchronization errors–for δ smaller than some constant–with
a rate of 1 − Θ(√δ log(1/δ)). This is an improvement in terms of rate-distance trade-off over the
state-of-the-art low-rate binary insertion-deletion codes by Guruswami and Wang [18]. The codes
by Guruswami and Wang [18] achieve a rate of 1−O(√δ log(1/δ)).
Finally, we introduce a slightly improved definition of edit-distance tree codes1, a generalization
of Schulman’s original tree codes defined by Braverman et al. [8]. We show that under our revised
definition, edit-distance tree codes are closely related to synchronization strings. For example,
edit-distance tree codes can be constructed by merging a regular tree code and a synchronization
string. This transfers, for example, Braverman’s sub-exponential time tree code construction [6]
and the candidate construction of Schulman [28] from tree codes to edit-distance tree codes. Lastly,
as a side note, we will show that with the improved definition, the coding scheme of Braverman et
al. [8] can tolerate 1/10 − ε fraction of synchronization errors rather than 1/18 − ε fraction that
the scheme based on their original definition did.
1.2 The Organization of the Paper
We start by reviewing basic definitions and concepts regarding interactive communication and
synchronization strings in Section 2. Then we study channel simulations under various assumptions
in Section 3. We use these channel simulations to obtain novel coding schemes for one-way and
interactive communication in Sections 3 and 4. Finally, in Section 6, we discuss connections between
synchronization strings, tree codes and edit-distance tree codes introduced by Braverman et al. [8].
2 Definitions and preliminaries
In this section, we define the channel models and communication settings considered in this work.
We also provide notation and define synchronization strings.
Error model and communication channels. In this work, we study two types of channels,
which we call corruption channels and insertion-deletion channels. In the corruption channel model,
two parties communicate with an alphabet Σ, and if one party sends a message c ∈ Σ to the other
party, then the other party will receive a message c˜ ∈ Σ, but it may not be the case that c = c˜.
In the one-way communication setting over an insertion-deletion channel, messages to the lis-
tening party may be inserted, and messages sent by the sending party may be deleted. The two-way
channel requires a more careful setup. We emphasize that we cannot hope to protect against arbi-
trary insertions and deletions in the two-way setting because in the message-driven model, a single
deletion could cause the protocol execution to “hang.” Therefore, following the standard model
of Braverman et al.’s work [8] that is employed in all other previous works on this problem [30],
we restrict our attention to edit corruptions, which consist of a single deletion followed by a single
insertion, which may be aimed at either party. Braverman et al. [8] provide a detailed discussion
on their model and show that it is strong enough to generalize other natural models one might
consider, including models that utilize clock time-outs to overcome the stalling issue.
In both the one- and two-way communication settings, we study adversarial channels with error
rate δ. Our coding schemes are robust in both the fully adversarial and the oblivious adversary
models. In the fully adversarial model, the adversary may decide at each round whether or not
to interfere based on its state, its own randomness, and the symbols communicated by the parties
1This improved definition is independently observed by Sherstov and Wu [30].
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so far. In the oblivious adversary model, the adversary must decide which rounds to corrupt
in advance, and therefore independently of the communication history. A simple example of an
oblivious adversary is the random error channel, where each round is corrupted with probability δ.
In models we study, there is no pre-shared randomness between the parties.
Interactive and one-way communication protocols. In an interactive protocol Π over a
channel with an alphabet Σ, Alice and Bob begin with two inputs from Σ∗ and then engage in
n rounds of communication. In a single round, each party either listens for a message or sends a
message, where this choice and the message, if one is generated, depends on the party’s state, its
input, and the history of the communication thus far. After the n rounds, the parties produce an
output. We study alternating protocols, where each party sends a message every other round and
listens for a message every other round. In this message-driven paradigm, a party “sleeps” until a
new message comes, at which point the party performs a computation and sends a message to the
other party. Protocols in the interactive communication literature typically fall into two categories:
message-driven and clock-driven. In the message-driven paradigm, a party “sleeps” until a new
message comes, at which point the party performs a computation and sends a message to the other
party. Meanwhile, in the clock-driven model, each party has a clock, and during a single tick, each
party accepts a new message if there is one, performs a computation, and sends a message to the
other party if he chooses to do so. In this work, we study the message-driven model, since in the
clock-driven model, dealing with insertions and deletions is too easy. After all, an insertion would
mean that one symbol is changed to another as in the case of the standard corruption model and
a deletion would be detectable, as it would correspond to an erasure. In the presence of noise, we
say that a protocol Π′ robustly simulates a deterministic protocol Π over a channel C if given any
inputs for Π, the parties can decode the transcript of the execution of Π on those inputs over a
noise-free channel from the transcript of the execution of Π′ over C.
Finally, we also study one-way communication, where one party sends all messages and the
other party listens. Coding schemes in this setting are known as error-correcting codes.
String notation and edit distance. Let S be a string of n symbols from an alphabet Σ. For
i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, we denote the substring of S from the ith index through and including the jth
index as S[i, j]. We refer to the substring from the ith index through, but not including, the jth
index as S[i, j). The substrings S(i, j] and S(i, j) are similarly defined. Finally, S[i] denotes the ith
symbol of S and |S| = n is the length of S. Occasionally, the alphabets we use are the Cartesian
product of several alphabets, i.e. Σ = Σ1 × · · · × Σn. If T is a string over Σ, then we write
T [i] = [a1, . . . , an], where ai ∈ Σi. Throughout this work, we rely on the well-known edit distance
metric, which measures the smallest number of insertions and deletions necessary to transform one
string to another.
Definition 2.1 (Edit distance). The edit distance ED(c, c′) between two strings c, c′ ∈ Σ∗ is the
minimum number of insertions and deletions required to transform c into c′.
It is easy to see that edit distance is a metric on any set of strings and in particular is symmetric
and satisfies the triangle inequality property. Furthermore, ED (c, c′) = |c| + |c′| − 2 · LCS (c, c′),
where LCS (c, c′) is the longest common substring of c and c′. We also use the string matching
notation from [8]:
Definition 2.2 (String matching). Suppose that c and c′ are two strings in Σ∗, and suppose that
∗ is a symbol not in Σ. Next, suppose that there exist two strings τ1 and τ2 in (Σ ∪ {∗})∗ such
that |τ1| = |τ2|, del (τ1) = c, del(τ2) = c′, and τ1[i] ≈ τ2[i] for all i ∈ {1, . . . , |τ1|}. Here, del is a
function that deletes every ∗ in the input string and a ≈ b if a = b or one of a or b is ∗. Then we
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say that τ = (τ1, τ2) is a string matching between c and c
′ (denoted τ : c → c′). We furthermore
denote with sc (τi) the number of ∗’s in τi.
Note that the edit distance between strings c, c′ ∈ Σ∗ is exactly equal to minτ :c→c′ {sc (τ1) + sc (τ2)}.
Definition 2.3 (Suffix distance). Given any two strings c, c˜ ∈ Σ∗, the suffix distance between c
and c˜ is SD (c, c˜) = minτ :c→c˜
{
max
|τ1|
i=1
{
sc(τ1[i,|τ1|])+sc(τ2[i,|τ2|])
|τ1|−i+1−sc(τ1[i,|τ1|])
}}
.
Synchronization Strings. We now recall the definition of synchronization strings, which were
first introduced by Haeupler and Shahrasbi [21] and further studied in [10,22,23], along with some
important lemmas from [21] which we will need here. In short, synchronization strings [21] allow
communicating parties to protect against synchronization errors by indexing their messages without
blowing up the communication rate. We describe this technique by introducing two intermediaries,
CA and CB, that conduct the communication over the given insertion-deletion channel. CA receives
all symbols that Alice wishes to send to Bob, CA sends the symbols to CB, and CB communicates
the symbols to Bob. CA and CB handle the synchronization strings and all the extra work that is
involved in keeping Alice and Bob in sync by guessing the actual index of symbols received by CB.
In this way, Alice and Bob communicate via CA and CB as though they were communicating over
a half-error channel.
Unfortunately, trivially adding the indices 1, 2, . . . , n to each message will not allow us to main-
tain a near optimal communication rate. After all, suppose that CA and CB are communicating
over an alphabet Σ of constant size. If CA adds an index to each of Alice’s messages, it would
increase the size of Σ by a factor of n and the rate would increase by a factor of 1/ log n, which is
far from optimal. Synchronization strings allow the communicating parties to index their messages
using an alphabet size that is polynomial in 1/δ and is thus independent of the total communica-
tion length n. Of course, some accuracy is lost when deviating from the trivial indexing strategy.
Therefore, if CA sends CB indices attached to each of Alice’s n messages, we need a notion of how
well CB is able to determine those indices in the presence of synchronization errors. This is where
the notion of a string matching comes in handy.
Suppose that with each of Alice’s n messages, CA sends an encoding of her index using a symbol
from Σ. Let S be a “synchronization string” consisting of all n encoded indices sent by CA. Next,
suppose that the adversary injects a total of nδ insertions and deletions, thus transforming the string
S to the string Sτ . Here, τ = (τ1, τ2) is a string matching such that del(τ1) = S, del(τ2) = Sτ , and
for all k ∈ [|τ1|] = [|τ2|],
(τ1[k], τ2[k]) =

(S[i], ∗) if S[i] is deleted
(S[i], Sτ [j]) if Sτ [j] is successfully transmitted and sent as S[i]
(∗, Sτ [j]) if Sτ [j] is inserted,
where i is the index of τ1[1, k] upon deleting the stars in τ1[1, k], or in other words, i = |del(τ1[1, k])|
and similarly j = |del(τ1[1, k])|. We formally say that a symbol Sτ [j] is successfully transmitted if
there exists a k such that |del(τ2[1, k])| = j and τ1[k] = τ2[k]. It was not inserted or deleted by the
adversary.
We assume that CA and CB know the string S a priori. The intermediary CB will receive
a set of transmitted indices Sτ [1], . . . , Sτ [n]. Upon receipt of the jth transmitted index, for all
j ∈ [n], CB approximately matches Sτ [1, j] to a prefix S[1, i] and therefore guesses that CA has
sent i messages. We call the algorithm that CB runs to determine this matching an (n, δ)-indexing
algorithm. The algorithm can also return a symbol > which represents an “I don’t know” response.
Formally, we define an (n, δ)-indexing algorithm as follows.
6
Definition 2.4 ((n, δ)-Indexing Algorithm). The pair (S,DS) consisting of a string S ∈ Σn and an
algorithm DS is called an (n, δ)-indexing algorithm over alphabet Σ if for any set of nδ insertions
and deletions corresponding to the string matching τ and altering the string S to a string Sτ , the
algorithm DS(Sτ ) outputs either > or an index between 1 and n for every symbol in Sτ .
How well can an (n, δ)-indexing algorithm perform? We can only hope to correctly decode
symbols that are successfully transmitted. Recall that the symbol Sτ [j] is successfully transmitted
if there exists an index k such that |del(τ2[1, k])| = j and τ1[k] = S[i] for some i ∈ [n]. It makes
sense, then, to say that the algorithm correctly decodes Sτ [j] if it successfully recovers the index
i. Indeed, we express this notion formally by saying that an (n, δ)-indexing algorithm (S,DS)
decodes index j correctly under τ = (τ1, τ2) if DS(Sτ ) outputs i and there exists a k such that
i = |del(τ1[1, k])|, j = |del(τ2[1, k])|, τ1[k] = S[i], and τ2[k] = Sτ [j]. Notice that outputting >
counts as an incorrect decoding. We now have the language to describe how well an (n, δ)-indexing
algorithm performs. An algorithm has at most k misdecodings if for any τ corresponding to at
most nδ insertions and deletions, there are at most k successfully transmitted, incorrectly decoded
indices. An indexing algorithm is streaming if the decoded index for the ith element of the string
Sτ only depends on Sτ [1, i].
Haeupler and Shahrasbi defined a family of synchronization strings that admit an (n, δ)-indexing
algorithm with strong performance [21]. This family is characterized by a parameter ε as follows.
Definition 2.5 (ε-Synchronization String). A string S ∈ Σn is an ε-synchronization string if for
every 1 ≤ i < j < k ≤ n+ 1 we have that ED (S[i, j), S[j, k)) > (1− ε)(k − i).
Haeupler and Shahrasbi provide an efficient randomized construction of ε-synchronization strings
of arbitrary length.
Lemma 2.6 (From [21]). There exists a randomized algorithm which, for any ε > 0, constructs a
ε-synchronization string of length n over an alphabet of size O(ε−4) in expected time O(n5).
They prove the following useful property which leads them to an indexing algorithm.
Lemma 2.7 (From [21]). Let S ∈ Σn be an ε-synchronization string and let Sτ [1, j] be a prefix of
Sτ . Then there exists at most one index i ∈ [n] such that the suffix distance between Sτ [1, j] and
S[1, i], denoted by SD(Sτ [1, j], S[1, i]) is at most 1− ε.
This lemma suggests a simple (n, δ)-indexing algorithm given an input prefix Sτ [1, j]: Use
dynamic programming to search over all prefixes of S for the one with the smallest suffix distance
from Sτ [1, j]. Haeupler and Shahrasbi present a dynamic programming algorithm which is efficient
and results in a small number of misdecodings, and described in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.8 (From [21]). Let S ∈ Σn be an ε-synchronization string that is sent over an insertion-
deletion channel with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions. There exists a streaming (n, δ)-
indexing algorithm that returns a solution with ci1−ε +
cdε
1−ε misdecodings. The algorithm runs in
time O(n5), spending O(n4) on each received symbol.
3 Channel Simulations
In this section, we show how ε-synchronization strings can be used as a powerful tool to simulate
corruption channels over insertion-deletion channels. In Section 5, we use these simulations to
introduce coding schemes resilient to insertion-deletion errors.
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We study the context where Alice and Bob communicate over an insertion-deletion channel,
but via a blackbox channel simulation, they are able to run coding schemes that are designed
for half-error channels. As we describe in Section 2, we discuss this simulation by introducing
two intermediaries, CA and CB, that conduct the simulation by communicating over the given
insertion-deletion channel.
3.1 One-way channel simulation over a large alphabet
Assume that Alice and Bob have access to n rounds of communication over a one-way insertion-
deletion channel where the adversary is allowed to insert or delete up to nδ symbols. In this
situation, we formally define a corruption channel simulation over the given insertion-deletion
channel as follows:
Definition 3.1 (Corruption Channel Simulation). Let Alice and Bob have access to n rounds of
communication over a one-way insertion-deletion channel with the alphabet Σ. The adversary may
insert or delete up to nδ symbols. Intermediaries CA and CB simulate n
′ rounds of a corruption
channel with alphabet Σsim over the given channel as follows. First, the adversary can insert a
number of symbols into the insertion-deletion channel between CA and CB. Then for n
′ rounds
i = 1, . . . , n′, the following procedure repeats:
1. Alice gives Xi ∈ Σsim to CA.
2. Upon receiving Xi from Alice, CA wakes up and sends a number of symbols (possibly zero)
from the alphabet Σ to CB through the given insertion-deletion channel. The adversary can
delete any of these symbols or insert symbols before, among, or after them.
3. Upon receiving symbols from the channel, CB wakes up and reveals a number of symbols
(possibly zero) from the alphabet Σsim to Bob. We say all such symbols are triggered by Xi.
Throughout this procedure, the adversary can insert or delete up to nδ symbols. However, CB is
required to reveal exactly n′ symbols to Bob regardless of the adversary’s actions. Let X˜1, · · · , X˜n′ ∈
Σsim be the symbols revealed to Bob by CB. This procedure successfully simulates n
′ rounds of a
corruption channel with a δ′ fraction of errors if for all but n′δ′ elements i of the set {1, . . . , n′},
the following conditions hold: 1) X˜i = Xi; and 2) X˜i is triggered by Xi.
When X˜i = Xi and X˜i is triggered by Xi, we call X˜i an uncorrupted symbol. The second condi-
tion, that X˜i is triggered by Xi, is crucial to preserving linearity of time, which is the fundamental
quality that distinguishes channel simulations from channel codings. It forces CA to communicate
each symbol to Alice as soon as it arrives. Studying channel simulations satisfying this condition
is especially important in situations where Bob’s messages depends on Alice’s, and vice versa.
Conditions (1) and (2) also require that CB conveys at most one uncorrupted symbol each
time he wakes up. As the adversary may delete nδ symbols from the insertion-deletion channel,
CB will wake up at most n(1 − δ) times. Therefore, we cannot hope for a corruption channel
simulation where Bob receives more than n(1− δ) uncorrupted symbols. In the following theorem,
we prove something slightly stronger: no deterministic one-way channel simulation can guarantee
that Bob receives more than n(1− 4δ/3) uncorrupted symbols and if the simulation is randomized,
the expected number of uncorrupted transmitted symbols is at most n(1−7δ/6). This puts channel
simulation in contrast to channel coding as one can recover 1− δ − ε fraction of symbols there (as
shown in [21]).
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Theorem 3.2. Assume that n uses of a one-way insertion-deletion channel over an arbitrarily
large alphabet Σ with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. There is no deterministic
simulation of a corruption channel over any alphabet Σsim where the simulated channel guaran-
tees more than n (1− 4δ/3) uncorrupted transmitted symbols. If the simulation is randomized, the
expected number of uncorrupted transmitted symbols is at most n(1− 7δ/6).
Proof. Consider a simulation of n′ rounds of a corruption channel on an insertion-deletion channel.
Note that for any symbol that CA receives, she will send some number of symbols to CB. This
number can be zero or non-zero and may also depend on the content of the symbol she receives.
We start by proving the claim for deterministic simulations. Let X1, X2, · · · , Xn′ ∈ Σsim and
X ′1, X ′2, · · · , X ′n′ ∈ Σsim be two possible sets of inputs that Alice may pass to CA such that for any
1 ≤ i ≤ n′, Xi 6= X ′i and Y1, · · · , Ym ∈ Σ and let Y ′1 , · · · , Y ′m′ ∈ Σ be the symbols that CA sends to
CB through the insertion-deletion channel as a result of receiving {Xi} and {X ′i} respectively.
Now, consider Y1, · · · , Ynδ. Let k be the number of CA’s input symbols which are required to
trigger her to output Y1, · · · , Ynδ. We prove Theorem 3.2 in the following two cases:
1. k ≤ 2nδ3 : In this case, Y1, · · · , Ynδ will cause CB to output at most 2nδ3 uncorrupted symbols.
If the adversary deletes nδ arbitrary elements among Ynδ+1, · · · , Ym, then CB will receive
m − 2nδ ≤ n − 2nδ symbols afterwards; Therefore, he cannot output more than n − 2nδ
uncorrupted symbols as the result of receiving Ynδ+1, · · · , Ym. Hence, no simulation can
guarantee n(1− 2δ) + k < n (1− 43δ) uncorrupted symbols or more.
2. k > 2nδ3 : Consider the following two scenarios:
(a) Alice tries to convey X1, X2, · · · , Xn′ to Bob using the simulation. The adversary deletes
the first nδ symbols. Therefore, CB receives Ynδ+1, · · · , Ym.
(b) Alice tries to convey X ′1, X ′2, · · · , X ′n′ to Bob using the simulation. The adversary inserts
Ynδ+1, · · · , Y2nδ at the very beginning of the communication. Therefore, CB receives
Ynδ+1, · · · , Y2nδ, Y ′1 , Y ′2 , · · · , Y ′m′ .
Note that the first nδ symbols that CB receives in these two scenarios are the same. Assume
that CB outputs k
′ symbols as the result of the first nδ symbols he receives. In the first
scenario, the number of uncorrupted symbols CB outputs as the result of his first nδ inputs
is at most max{0, k′ − k}. Additionally, at most m − 2nδ ≤ n − 2nδ uncorrupted messages
may be conveyed within the rest of the communication. In the second scenario, the number
of uncorrupted communicated symbols is at most n− k′.
Now, at least for one of these scenarios the number of guaranteed uncorrupted symbols in the
simulation is
min
{
n− 2nδ + max{0, k′ − k}, n− k′} ≤ max
k′
min
{
n− 2nδ + max{0, k′ − k}, n− k′}
≤ max
k′
min
{
n− 2nδ + max{0, k′ − 2nδ/3}, n− k′}
= n− 4nδ/3 = n
(
1− 4
3
δ
)
.
This completes the proof for deterministic simulations. Now, we proceed to the case of randomized
simulations.
Take an arbitrary input sequence X1, · · · , Xn′ ∈ Σn′ . Let KX be the random variable that
represents the number of CA’s input symbols which are required to trigger her to output her first
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nδ symbols to CB. If Pr{KX ≤ 2nδ/3} ≥ 12 , for any sequence X1, · · · , X¯n′ given to CA by Alice, the
adversary acts as follows. He lets the first nδ symbols sent by CA pass through the insertion-deletion
channel and then deletes the next nδ symbols that CA sends to CB. As in the deterministic case,
if KX ≤ 2nδ/3, the number of uncorrupted symbols conveyed to Bob cannot exceed n(1 − 4δ/3).
Hence, the expected number of uncorrupted symbols in the simulation may be upper-bounded by:
E[Uncorrupted Symbols] ≤ p · n(1− 4δ/3) + (1− p) · n(1− δ)
≤ n
(
1− 3 + p
3
δ
)
≤ n
(
1− 3 + 1/2
3
δ
)
= n
(
1− 7
6
δ
)
.
Now, assume that Pr{KX ≤ 2nδ/3} < 12 . Take an arbitrary input X ′1, X ′2, · · · , X ′n′ ∈ Σsim such
that Xi 6= X ′i for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n′. Consider the following scenarios:
(a) Alice tries to convey X1, X2, · · · , Xn′ to Bob using the simulation. The adversary removes the
first nδ symbols sent by CA. This means that CB receives is Ynδ+1, · · · , Ym where Y1, · · · , Ym
is a realization of CA’s output distribution given X1, X2, · · · , Xn′ as input.
(b) Alice tries to convey X ′1, X ′2, · · · , X ′n′ to Bob using the simulation. The adversary mimics CA
and generates a sample of CA’s output distribution given X1, X2, · · · , Xn′ as input. Let that
sample be Y1, · · · , Ym. The adversary inserts Ynδ+1, · · · , Y2nδ at the beginning and then lets
the communication go on without errors.
Note that the distribution of the first nδ symbols that CB receives, i.e., Ynδ+1, · · · , Y2nδ, is the
same in both scenarios. Let K ′X′ be the random variable that represents the number of symbols in
CB’s output given that specific distribution over the symbols Ynδ+1, · · · , Y2nδ. Now, according to
the discussion we had for deterministic simulations, for the first scenario:
E[Uncorrupted Symbols] ≤ E[n− 2nδ + max{0,K ′X′ −KX}]
≤ n− 2nδ + p · E[K ′X′ ] + (1− p)(E[K ′X′ ]− 2nδ/3)
≤ n− 2nδ + E[K ′X′ ]− 2(1− p)nδ/3
and for the second one:
E[Uncorrupted Symbols] ≤ E[n−K ′X′ ] ≤ n− E[K ′X′ ].
Therefore, in one of the above-mentioned scenarios
E[Uncorrupted Symbols] ≤ min{n− 2nδ + E[K ′X′ ]− 2(1− p)nδ/3, n− E[K ′X′ ]}
≤ max
γ
min{n− 2nδ + γ − 2(1− p)nδ/3, n− γ}
= n
(
1− 4− p
3
δ
)
< n
(
1− 4− 1/2
3
δ
)
= n
(
1− 7
6
δ
)
.
Therefore, for any randomized simulation, there exists an input and a strategy for the adversary
where
E[Uncorrupted Symbols] ≤ n
(
1− 7
6
δ
)
.
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We now provide a channel simulation using ε-synchronization strings. Every time CA receives
a symbol from Alice (from an alphabet Σsim), CA appends a new symbol from a predetermined ε-
synchronization string over an alphabet Σsyn to Alice’s symbol and sends it as one message through
the channel. On the other side of channel, suppose that CB has already revealed some number of
symbols to Bob. Let IB be the index of the next symbol CB expects to receive. In other words,
suppose that CB has already revealed IB − 1 symbols to Bob. Upon receiving a new symbol from
CA, CB uses the part of the message coming from the synchronization string to guess the index of
the message Alice sent. We will refer to this decoded index as I˜A and its actual index as IA. If
I˜A < IB, then CB reveals nothing to Bob and ignores the message he just received. Meanwhile, if
I˜A = IB, then CB reveals Alice’s message to Bob. Finally, if I˜A > IB, then CB sends a dummy
symbol to Bob and then sends Alice’s message.
Given that the adversary can insert or delete up to nδ symbols, if CA sends n symbols, then
CB may receive between n− nδ and n+ nδ symbols. We do not assume the parties have access to
a clock, so we must prevent CB from stalling after CA has sent all n messages. Therefore, CB only
listens to the first n(1− δ) symbols it receives.
The protocols of CA and CB are more formally described in Algorithm 1 . Theorem 3.3 details
the simulation guarantees.
Algorithm 1 Simulation of a one-way constant alphabet channel
1: Initialize parameters: S ← ε-synchronization string of length n
2: if CA then
3: Reset Status: i← 0
4: for n iterations do
5: Get m from Alice, send (m,S[i]) to CB , and increment i by 1.
6: if CB then
7: Reset Status: IB ← 0
8: for n(1− δ) iterations do
9: Receive (m˜, s˜) sent by CA and set I˜A ← Synchronization string decode(s˜, S)
10: if I˜A = IB then
11: Send m˜ to Bob and increment IB .
12: if I˜A < IB then
13: Continue
14: if I˜A > IB then
15: Send a dummy symbol and then m˜ to Bob, then increment IB by 2.
Theorem 3.3. Assume that n uses of a one-way insertion-deletion channel over an alphabet Σ
with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. Using an ε-synchronization string over an
alphabet Σsyn, it is possible to simulate n(1− δ) rounds of a one-way corruption channel over Σsim
with at most 2nδ(2 + (1− ε)−1) symbols corrupted so long as |Σsim| × |Σsyn| ≤ |Σ| and δ < 1/7.
Proof. Let Alice and Bob use n rounds of an insertion-deletion channel over alphabet Σ as sender
and receiver respectively. We describe the simulation as being coordinated by two intermediaries
CA and CB, who act according to Algorithm 1.
In order to find a lower-bound on the number of rounds of the simulated communication that
remain uncorrupted, we upper-bound the number of rounds that can be corrupted. To this end,
let the adversary insert ki symbols and delete kd symbols from the communication. Clearly, the kd
deleted symbols do not pass across the channel. Also, each of the ki inserted symbols may cause
CB to change IB. We call these two cases error-bad incidents. Further, nδ+ ki− kd symbols at the
end of the communication are not conveyed to Bob as we truncate the communication at n(1− δ).
Moreover, according to Theorem 2.8, ki1−ε+
kdε
1−ε successfully transmitted symbols may be misdecoded
upon their arrival. We call such incidents decoding-bad incidents. Finally, we need to count the
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number of successfully transmitted symbols whose indexes are decoded correctly (I˜A = IA) but do
not get conveyed to Bob because I˜A 6∈ {IB, IB + 1}, which we call zero-bad incidents. Zero-bad
incidents happen only if |IA − IB| 6= 0. To count the number of zero-bad incidents, we have to
analyze how IA and IB change in any of the following cases:
Cases when IA > IB IA IB IA − IB
Deletion by the Adversary +1 0 +1
Insertion by the Adversary 0 0,+1,+2 0, -1, -2
Correctly Transmitted but Misdecoded +1 0,+1,+2 -1, 0, +1
Correctly Transmitted and Decoded +1 +2 -1
Cases when IA < IB IA IB IB − IA
Deletion by the Adversary +1 0 -1
Insertion by the Adversary 0 0,+1,+2 0, +1, +2
Correctly Transmitted but Misdecoded +1 0,+1,+2 -1, 0, +1
Correctly Transmitted and Decoded +1 0 -1
Cases when IA = IB IA IB IB − IA
Deletion by the Adversary +1 0 -1
Insertion by the Adversary 0 0,+1,+2 0, +1, +2
Correctly Transmitted but Misdecoded +1 0,+1,+2 -1, 0, +1
Correctly Transmitted and Decoded +1 +1 0
Table 1: How IA and IB change in different scenarios.
Note that any insertion may increase |IA−IB| by up to 2 units and any misdecoding or deletion
may increase |IA− IB| by up to 1 unit. Therefore, |IA− IB| may be increased 2ki + kd + ki1−ε + kdε1−ε
throughout the algorithm. However, as any successfully transmitted and correctly decoded symbol
decreases this variable by at least one, there are at most 2ki + kd +
ki
1−ε +
kdε
1−ε zero-bad incidents,
i.e. successfully transmitted and correctly decoded symbols that are not conveyed successfully in
the simulated corruption channel.
Hence, the following is an upper-bound on the number of symbols that may not remain uncor-
rupted in the simulated channel:
#(error-bad) + #(decoding-bad) + #(zero-bad) + #(truncated symbols)
≤ kd +
[
ki
1− ε +
kdε
1− ε
]
+
[
2ki + kd +
ki
1− ε +
kdε
1− ε
]
+ [nδ + ki − kd]
= nδ + kd
(
1 +
2ε
1− ε
)
+ ki
(
3 +
2
1− ε
)
≤ nδ
(
4 +
2
1− ε
)
.
As error fraction shall not exceed one, the largest δ for which this simulation works is as follows.
nδ
(
4 + 21−ε
)
n(1− δ)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
6δ
1− δ < 1⇔ δ <
1
7
3.2 Interactive channel simulation over a large alphabet
We now turn to channel simulations for interactive channels. As in Section 3.1, we formally define
a corruption interactive channel simulation over a given insertion-deletion interactive channel. We
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Algorithm 2 Simulation of a corruption channel using an insertion-deletion channel with a large
alphabet: CA’s procedure
1: Π← n-round interactive coding scheme over a corruption channel to be simulated
2: Initialize parameters: S ← ε-synchronization string of length n/2
3: IA ← 0
4: for n/2− nδ
(
1 + 1
1−ε
)
iterations do
5: Get m from Alice, send (m,S[IA]) to CB , and increment IA by 1.
6: Get (m˜, S˜) from CB and send m˜ to Alice.
7: Commit.
8: for nδ
(
1 + 1
1−ε
)
iterations do
9: Send (0, 0) to CB , and increment IA by 1.
10: Get (m˜, S˜) from CB .
then use synchronization strings to present one such simulation.
Definition 3.4 (Corruption Interactive Channel Simulation). Let Alice and Bob have access to
n rounds of communication over an interactive insertion-deletion channel with alphabet Σ. The
adversary may insert or delete up to nδ symbols. The simulation of an interactive corruption
channel is performed by a pair of intermediaries CA and CB where Alice communicates with CA,
CA interacts over the given insertion-deletion channel with CB, and CB communicates with Bob.
More precisely, CA and CB simulate n
′ rounds of a corruption interactive channel with alphabet
Σsim over the given channel as follows. The communication starts when Alice gives a symbol from
Σsim to CA. Then Alice, Bob, CA, and CB continue the communication as follows:
1. Whenever CA receives a symbol from Alice or CB, he either reveals a symbol from Σsim to
Alice or sends a symbol from Σ through the insertion-deletion channel to CB.
2. Whenever CB receives a symbol from Bob or CA, he either reveals a symbol from Σsim to Bob
or send a symbols from Σ through the insertion-deletion channel to CA.
3. Whenever CB reveals a symbol to Bob, Bob responds with a new symbol from Σsim.
4. Whenever CA reveals a symbol to Alice, Alice responds with a symbol in Σsim except for the
n′
2 th time.
Throughout this procedure, the adversary can inject up to nδ edit corruptions. However, regardless of
the adversary’s actions, CA and CB have to reveal exactly n
′/2 symbols to Alice and Bob respectively.
Let X1, . . . , Xn′ be the symbols Alice gives to CA and X˜1, . . . , X˜n′ ∈ Σsim be the symbols CB
reveals to Bob. Similarly, Let Y1, . . . , Yn′ be the symbols Bob gives to CB and Y˜1, . . . , Y˜n′ ∈ Σsim
be the symbols CA reveals to Alice. We call each pair of tuples (Xi, X˜i) and (Yi, Y˜i) a round of the
simulated communication. We call a round corrupted if its elements are not equal. This procedure
successfully simulates n′ rounds of a corruption interactive channel with a δ′ fraction of errors if
for all but n′δ′ of the rounds are corrupted.
Theorem 3.5. Assume that n uses of an interactive insertion-deletion channel over an alphabet
Σ with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. Using an ε-synchronization string over
an alphabet Σsyn, it is possible to simulate n− 2nδ(1 + (1− ε)−1) uses of an interactive corruption
channel over Σsim with at most a
2δ(5−3ε)
1−ε+2εδ−4δ fraction of symbols corrupted so long as |Σsim| ×
|Σsyn| ≤ |Σ| and δ < 1/14.
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Algorithm 3 Simulation of a corruption channel using an insertion-deletion channel with a large
alphabet: CB’s procedure
1: Π← n-round interactive coding scheme over a corruption channel to be simulated
2: Initialize parameters: S ← ε-synchronization string of length n/2
3: IB ← 0
4: for n/2 iterations do
5: Receive (m˜, s˜) from CA.
6: I˜A ← Synchronization string decode(s˜, S).
7: if Committed then
8: Send a dummy message to CA.
9: else if I˜A = IB then
10: Send m˜ to Bob and increment IB by 1.
11: Receive m from Bob and send (m, 0) to CA.
12: else if I˜A < IB then
13: Send a dummy message to CA.
14: else if I˜A > IB then
15: Send a dummy message to Bob.
16: Send m˜ to Bob and increment IB by 2.
17: Receive m from Bob and send (m, 0) to CA.
18: If IB = n/2− nδ
(
1 + 1
1−ε
)
, commit.
Proof. Suppose that Alice and Bob want to communicate a total of n−2nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
symbols over
the simulated corruption channel, and that this channel is simulated by the intermediaries CA and
CB, who are communicating via a total of n uses of an insertion-deletion channel. We will show
later on that both parties have the chance to commit before the other has sent n/2 messages over
the insertion-deletion channel. We say an intermediary commits when it finishes simulating the
channel for its corresponding party, i.e., when it sends the last simulated symbol out. Intermediaries
may commit and yet carry on exchanging symbols over the channel so that the other intermediary
finishes its simulation as well. An intermediary may stall by waiting for receiving symbols from
the channel but the nature of simulation necessitates the intermediaries not to stall before they
commit.
To analyze this simulation, we categorize the bad events that could occur as follows. We say
that CA takes a step when it sends a message, receives a message, and completes its required
communication with Alice. We say that CA’s step is good if the message CA receives is an un-
corrupted response to its previous outgoing message and CB correctly decodes the index that CA
sends. Figure 1 illustrates a sequence of steps where only the first is good.
If CA has a good step when IA = IB and neither party has committed, then Alice and Bob are
guaranteed to have an error-free round of communication. We lower bound the total number of Alice
and Bob’s error-free rounds of communication by lower bounding the number of good steps that
CA takes when IA = IB. The total number of good steps CA takes is S = n/2− nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
− d,
where d is the number of rounds there are before CA commits but after CB commits, if CB commits
first. If a step is not good, then we say it is bad. Specifically, we say that it is commit-bad if CB
commits before CA. We say that it is decoding-bad if neither party has committed, CB receives an
uncorrupted message from CA, but CB does not properly decode the synchronization string index.
Otherwise, we say that a bad step is error-bad. Since every good step corresponds to a message
sent by both Alice and Bob, we may lower bound the number of error-free messages sent over the
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Figure 1: Illustration of five steps where only the first is good.
corruption channel by
2
(
n
2
− nδ
(
1 +
1
1− ε
)
− d−#(error-bad steps)−#(decoding-bad steps)
−#(good steps when IA 6= IB)
)
.
In order to lower bound this quantity, we now upper bound d, the number of error-bad and decoding-
bad steps, and the number of good steps when IA 6= IB.
We claim that there are at most nδ error-bad steps since a single adversarial injection could
cause CA’s current step to be bad, but that error will not cause the next step to be bad. Next, we
appeal to Theorem 2.8 to bound the number of decoding-bad steps. The cited theorem guarantees
that if an ε-synchronization string of length m is sent over an insertion-deletion channel with a
δ′ fraction of errors, then the receiver will decode the index of the received symbol correctly for
all but δ
′m
1−ε symbols. In this scenario, m = n/2 and δ
′ = nδ/(n/2) = 2δ since an error over the
insertion-deletion channel can cause at most one error in the synchronization string transmission.
Therefore, there are at most nδ/(1− ε) decoding-bad steps.
Now, a single error, be it an adversarial injection or synchronization strings improper decoding,
may cause |IB − IA| to increase by at most two since a single error may cause CB to simulate
Step 16 of Algorithm 3 and increment IB by two, while IA does not change. Further, if an error
does not occur but CB incorrectly decodes the synchronization symbol CA sends, then |IB − IA|
may increase by at most one, since CB might increase IB by two or zero while CA increases IA
by one. Meanwhile, if |IA − IB| ≥ 1 and CA takes a good step, then this difference will decrease
by at least 1. In total, over the course of the computation, since there are at most nδ adversarial
injections and nδ1−ε synchronization string improper decodings, we have that |IB − IA| increases by
at most 2nδ + nδ1−ε , which means that CA will take at most 2nδ +
nδ
1−ε good steps where IB 6= IA.
We may bound this number of good steps a bit tighter as follows. Let I∗A and I
∗
B be the values
of IA and IB when the first of CA or CB commits. If |I∗A − I∗B| > 0, then each party only had at
most 2nδ + nδ1−ε − |I∗A − I∗B| good steps where IB 6= IA.
15
Finally, we must upper bound the number d of rounds there are before CA commits but after CB
commits if CB commits first. Assuming CB commits first, it must be that I
∗
B =
n
2 − nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
.
Therefore, the number of steps before CA commits is
d =
n
2
− nδ
(
1 +
1
1− ε
)
− I∗A = |I∗A − I∗B| .
We have shown that the number of error-free messages sent over the corruption channel is at
least
2
(
n
2
− nδ
(
1 +
1
1− ε
)
− d−#(error-bad steps)−#(decoding-bad steps)
−#(good steps when IA 6= IB)
)
≤ 2
(
n
2
− nδ
(
1 +
1
1− ε
)
− |I∗B − I∗A| − nδ −
nδ
1− ε −
(
2nδ +
nδ
1− ε − |I
∗
A − I∗B|
))
= n− 8nδ − 6nδ
1− ε.
Since Alice and Bob send a total of n − 2nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
messages over the simulated channel, the
error rate δs over the simulated channel is at most 1− n−8nδ−
6nδ
1−ε
n−2nδ(1+ 11−ε)
= 2δ(5−3ε)1−ε−2δ(1−ε)−2δ . Therefore,
if δ < 1/14, then δs <
2δ(5−3ε)
1−ε+2δε−4δ
∣∣∣
ε=0
= 10δ1−4δ < 1, as is necessary.
The last step is to show that CA has the chance to commit before CB has sent n/2 messages over
the insertion-deletion channel, and vice versa. Recall that CA (respectively CB) commits when IA
(respectively IB) equals n/2−nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
. Let iB be the number of messages sent by CB over the
insertion-deletion channel. The difference |iB−IA| only increases due to an error, and a single error
can only increase this difference by at most one. Therefore, when iB = n/2, IA ≥ n/2− nδ, so CA
has already committed. Next, IA only grows larger than IB if there is an error or if CB improperly
decodes a synchronization symbol and erroneously chooses to not increase IB. Therefore, IA is
never more than nδ
(
1 + 11−ε
)
larger than IB. This means that when IA = n/2, it must be that
IB ≥ n/2−
(
1 + 11−ε
)
, so CB has committed.
3.3 Binary interactive channel simulation
We now show that with the help of synchronization strings, a binary interactive insertion-deletion
channel can be used to simulate a binary interactive corruption channel, inducing a O˜(
√
δ) fraction
of bit-flips. In this way, the two communicating parties may interact as though they are commu-
nicating over a corruption channel. They therefore can employ corruption channel coding schemes
while using the simulator as a black box means of converting the insertion-deletion channel to a
corruption channel.
The key difference between this simulation and the one-way, large alphabet simulation is that
Alice and Bob communicate through CA and CB for blocks of r rounds, between which CA and CB
check if they are in sync. Due to errors, there may be times when Alice and Bob are in disagreement
about which block, and what part of the block, they are in. CA and CB ensure that Alice and Bob
are in sync most of the time.
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Algorithm 4 Simulation of a corruption channel using an insertion-deletion channel, at CA’s side
1: Π← n-round interactive coding scheme over a corruption channel to be simulated
2: Initialize parameters: r ←
√
log(1/δ)
δ
; Rtotal ←
⌈
n
√
δ
log(1/δ)
⌉
; s ← c log(1/δ); S ← ε-synchronization string of
length Rtotal
3: Reset Status: i← 0
4: for Rtotal iterations do
5: Send s zeros to CB
6: Send S[i] to CB
7: For r rounds, relay messages between CB and Alice
8: i← i + 1
When Alice sends CA a message from a new block of communication, CA holds that message
and alerts CB that a new block is beginning. CA does this by sending CB a header that is a string
consisting of a single one followed by s− 1 zeros (10s−1). Then, CA indicates which block Alice is
about to start by sending a synchronization symbol to CB. Meanwhile, when CB receives a 10
s−1
string, he listens for the synchronization symbol, makes his best guess about which block Alice is in,
and then communicates with Bob and CA accordingly. This might entail sending dummy blocks to
Bob or CA if he believes that they are in different blocks. Algorithms 4 and 5 detail CA and CB’s
protocol. To describe the guarantee that our simulation provides, we first define block corruption
channels.
Definition 3.6 (Block Corruption Channel). An n-round adversarial corruption channel is called a
(δ, r)-block corruption channel if the adversary is restricted to corrupt nδ symbols which are covered
by nδ/r blocks of r consecutively transmitted symbols.
Theorem 3.7. Suppose that n rounds of a binary interactive insertion-deletion channel with a δ
fraction of insertions and deletions are given. For sufficiently small δ, it is possible to deterministi-
cally simulate n(1−Θ(√δ log(1/δ))) rounds of a binary interactive (Θ(√δ log(1/δ)),√(1/δ) log(1/δ))-
block corruption channel between two parties, Alice and Bob, assuming that all substrings of form
10s−1 where s = c log(1/δ) that Alice sends can be covered by nδ intervals of
√
(1/δ) log(1/δ) con-
secutive rounds. The simulation is performed efficiently if the synchronization string is efficient
and works.
Proof. Suppose Alice and Bob communicate via intermediaries CA and CB who act according to
Algorithms 4 and 5. In total, Alice and Bob will attempt to communicate ns bits to one another
over the simulated channel, while CA and CB communicate a total of n bits to one another. The
adversary is allowed to insert or delete up to nδ symbols and CA sends n/2 bits, so CB may receive
between n/2− nδ and n/2 + nδ symbols. To prevent CB from stalling indefinitely, CB only listens
to the first n(1− 2δ)/2 bits he receives.
For r =
√
(1/δ) log(1/δ), we define a chunk to be rc := (s+ |Σsyn|+ r/2) consecutive bits that
are sent by CA to CB. In particular, a chunk corresponds to a section header and synchronization
symbol followed by r/2 rounds of messages sent from Alice. As CB cares about the first n(1−2δ)/2
bits it receives, there are n(1−2δ)2rc chunks in total. Hence, ns =
n(1−2δ)
2rc
· r since CB and CA’s
communication is alternating.
Note that if Alice sends a substring of form 10s−1 in the information part of a chunk, then Bob
mistakenly detects a new block. With this in mind, we say a chunk is good if:
1. There are no errors injected in the chunk or affecting CB’s detection of the chunk’s header,
2. CB correctly decodes the index that CA sends during the chunk, and
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Algorithm 5 Simulation of a corruption channel using an insertion-deletion channel, at CB’s side
1: Π← n-round interactive coding scheme over a corruption channel to be simulated
2: Initialize parameters: r ←
√
log(1/δ)
δ
; Rtotal ←
⌊
n(1− δ)
√
δ
log(1/δ)
⌋
; s← c log(1/δ); S ← ε-synchronization string
of length Rtotal
3: Reset Status: i, z, IB ← 0
4: for Rtotal iterations do
5: while z < s do
6: Receive b from CA
7: if b = 0 then
8: z← z + 1
9: else
10: z← 0
11: Send dummy bit to CA
12: z← 0
13: Receive m, the next |Σsyn| bits sent by CA
14: I˜A ← Synchronization string decode(m,S)
15: if I˜A = IB then
16: For r rounds, relay messages between CA and Bob
17: IB ← IB + 1
18: if I˜A < IB then
19: For r rounds, send dummy messages to CA
20: if I˜A > IB then
21: For r rounds, send dummy messages to Bob
22: For r rounds, relay messages between CA and Bob
23: IB ← IB + 2
3. CA does not send a 10
s−1 substring in the information portion of the chunk.
If a chunk is not good, we call it bad. If the chunk is bad because CB does not decode CA’s index
correctly even though they were in sync and no errors were injected, then we call it decoding-bad. If
it is bad because Alice sends a 10s−1 substring, we call it zero-bad and otherwise, we call it error-bad.
Throughout the protocol, CB uses the variable IB to denote the next index of the synchronization
string CB expects to receive and we use IA to denote the index of the synchronization string CA
most recently sent. Notice that if a chunk is good and IA = IB, then all messages are correctly
conveyed.
We now bound the maximum number of bad chunks that occur over the course of the simulation.
Suppose the adversary injects errors into the ith chunk, making that chunk bad. The (i + 1)th
chunk may also be bad, since Bob may not be listening for 10s−1 from CA when CA sends them,
and therefore may miss the block header. However, if the adversary does not inject any errors into
the (i + 1)th and the (i + 2)th chunk, then the (i + 2)th chunk will be good. In effect, a single
error may render at most two chunks useless. Since the adversary may inject nδ errors into the
insertion-deletion channel, this means that the number of chunks that are error-bad is at most 2nδ.
Additionally, by assumption, the number of zero-bad chunks is also at most nδ.
We also must consider the fraction of rounds that are decoding-bad. In order to do this, we
appeal to Theorem 2.8, which guarantees that if an ε-synchronization string of length N is sent
over an insertion-deletion channel with a δ′ fraction of insertions and deletions, then the receiver
will decode the index of the received symbol correctly for all but 2Nδ′/(1 − ε) symbols. In this
context, N is the number of chunks, i.e. N = n(1− 2δ)/(2rc), and the fraction of chunks corrupted
by errors is δ′ = 4nδ/N . Therefore, the total number of bad chunks is at most 4δn+2Nδ′/(1−ε) =
4δn(3− ε)/(1− ε).
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We will now use these bounds on the number of good and bad chunks to calculate how many
errors there are for Alice and Bob, communicating over the simulated channel. As noted, so long
as the chunk is good and IA = IB, then all messages are correctly conveyed to Alice from Bob
and vice versa. Meanwhile, a single error, be it an adversarial injection or a synchronization string
improper decoding, may cause |IB − IA| to increase by at most two since a single error may cause
Bob to erroneously simulate Step 13 and therefore increment IB by two when, in the worst case,
IA does not change. On the other hand, if |IB − IA| ≥ 1 and the chunk is good, this difference will
decrease by at least 1, as is clear from Lines 18 and 20 of Algorithm 5.
In total, we have that over the course of the computation, |IB − IA| increases at most 3−ε1−ε · 4δn
times and each time by at most 2. Therefore, there will be at most 3−ε1−ε · 8δn good chunks during
which |IB − IA| ≥ 1. This gives that all but 3−ε1−ε · 12δn chunks are good chunks and have IA = IB
upon their arrival on Bob’s side. Remember that the total number of chunks is n(1−2δ)2rc , hence, the
simulated channel is a
(
12δn(3−ε)/(1−ε)
n(1−2δ)/(2rc) , r
)
=
(
24δrc(3−ε)
(1−ε)(1−2δ) , r
)
block corruption channel.
Thus far, we have shown that one can simulate n(1− 2δ) r2rc rounds of a
(
24δrc(3−ε)
(1−ε)(1−2δ) , r
)
-block
corruption channel over a given channel as described in the theorem statement. More specifically,
over n(1 − 2δ) rounds of communication over the insertion-deletion channel, a 2rc−r2rc =
s+|Σsyn|
rc
fraction of rounds are used to add headers and synchronization symbols to chunks and a 24δrc(3−ε)(1−ε)(1−2δ)
fraction can be lost due to the errors injected by the adversary or 10s−1 strings in Alice’s stream
of bits. Therefore, the overall fraction of lost bits in this simulation is
s+|Σsyn|
rc
+ 24δrc(3−ε)(1−ε)(1−2δ) . Since
s = c log 1δ , ε and |Σsyn| are constants, and 1 − 2δ approaches to one for small δ, the optimal
asymptotic choice is r =
√
(1/δ) log 1/δ. This choice gives a simulated channel with characteristics
described in the theorem statement. This simulation is performed efficiently if the synchronization
symbols are efficiently computable.
The simulation stated in Theorem 3.7 burdens an additional condition on Alice’s stream of
bits by requiring it to have a limited number of substrings of form 10s−1. We now introduce
a high probability technique to modify a general interactive communication protocol in a way
that makes all substrings of form 10s−1 in Alice’s stream of bits fit into nδ intervals of length
r =
√
(1/δ) log(1/δ).
Lemma 3.8. Assume that n rounds of a binary interactive insertion-deletion channel with an
oblivious adversary who is allowed to inject nδ errors are given. There is a pre-coding scheme
that can be utilized on top of the simulation introduced in Theorem 3.7. It modifies the stream
of bits sent by Alice so that with probability 1 − e− c−32 nδ log 1δ (1+o(1)), all substrings of form 10s−1
where s = c log(1/δ) in the stream of bits Alice sends over the simulated channel can be covered
by nδ intervals of length r =
√
(1/δ) log(1/δ). This pre-coding scheme comes at the cost of a
Θ(
√
δ log(1/δ)) fraction of the bits Alice sends through the simulated channel.
Proof. Note that in the simulation process, each r2 consecutive bits Alice sends will form one of the
chunks CA sends to CB alongside some headers. The idea of this pre-coding is simple. Alice uses
the first s2 data bits (and not the header) of each chunk to share
s
2 randomly generated bits with
Bob (instead of running the interactive protocol) and then both of them extract a string S′ of r2
s
2 -wise independent random variables. Then, Alice XORs the rest of data bits she passes to CA
with S′ and Bob XORs those bits with S′ again to retrieve the original data.
We now determine the probability that the data block of a chunk of the simulation contains a
substring of form 10s−1. Note that if a block of size r2 contains a 10
s−1 substring, then one of its
substrings of length s2 starting at positions 0,
s
2 ,
2s
2 , · · · is all zero. Since P is s2 -wise independent,
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the probability of each of these s2 substrings containing only zeros is 2
− s
2 = δ
c
2 . Taking a union
bound over all these substrings, the probability of a block containing a 10s−1 substring can be
bounded above by
p =
r/2
s/2
· δ c2 =
√
δc−1
log(1/δ)
.
Now, we have:
Pr
{
Number of blocks containing 10s−1 > nδ
}
<
( n
s
nδ
)
pnδ ≤
( ne
nsδ
)nδ (√ δc−1
log(1/δ)
)nδ
<
(
δ(c−3)/2e
c log3/2(1/δ)
)nδ
= e−
c−3
2
nδ log 1
δ
(1+o(1)).
Applying this pre-coding for c ≥ 3 on top of the simulation from Theorem 3.7 implies the
following.
Theorem 3.9. Suppose that n rounds of a binary interactive insertion-deletion channel with a
δ fraction of insertions and deletions performed by an oblivious adversary are given. For suffi-
ciently small δ, it is possible to simulate n(1 − Θ(√δ log(1/δ))) rounds of a binary interactive
(Θ(
√
δ log(1/δ)),
√
(1/δ) log 1/δ)-block corruption channel between two parties over the given chan-
nel. The simulation works with probability 1− exp(−Θ(nδ log(1/δ))) and is efficient if the synchro-
nization string is efficient.
Lemma 3.10. Suppose that n rounds of a binary, interactive, fully adversarial insertion-deletion
channel with a δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. The pre-coding scheme proposed in
Lemma 3.8 ensures that the stream of bits sent by Alice contains fewer than nδ substrings of form
10s−1 for s = c log(1/δ) and c > 5 with probability 1− e−Θ(nδ log(1/δ)).
Proof. Lemma 3.8 ensures that for a fixed adversarial error pattern, the stream of bits sent by Alice
contains fewer than nδ substrings of form 10s−1 upon applying the pre-coding scheme. However,
in the fully adversarial setting, the adversary need not fix the error pattern in advance. Since the
communication is interactive, the adversary can thus adaptively alter the bits Alice chooses to send.
In this proof, we take a union bound over all error patterns with a δ fraction of errors and show
that with high probability, upon applying the pre-coding scheme, the stream of bits sent by Alice
contains fewer than Θ(nδ) substrings of form 10s−1.
We claim that the number of error patterns with exactly k insertions or deletions is at most
3k
(
n+k
k
)
. Note that if symbols s1, . . . , sn are being sent, each of the k errors can potentially occur
within the intervals [s1, s2), [s2, s3), . . . , [sn−1, sn), or after sn is sent. Each error could be a deletion,
insertion of “1”, or insertion of “0”. This gives the claimed error pattern count. Further, any error
pattern with fewer than k−1 errors can be thought of as an error pattern with either k−1 or k errors
where the adversary deletes an arbitrary set of symbols and then inserts the exact same symbols
immediately. Therefore, the number of all possible error patterns with at most nδ insertions or
deletions can be upper-bounded by
nδ∑
k=nδ−1
3k
(
n+ k
k
)
≤ 2 · 3nδ
(
n(1 + δ)
nδ
)
≤ 2 · 3nδ
(
n(1 + δ)e
nδ
)nδ
< 2
(
6e
δ
)nδ
= enδ log
1
δ
(1+o(1)).
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Now, since summation of exp (nδ log(1/δ)(1 + o(1))) many probabilities any of which smaller
than exp
(− c−32 nδ log(1/δ)(1 + o(1))) is still exp (−Θ (nδ log(1/δ))) for c > 5, the probability of
this pre-coding making more than nδ disjoint 10s−1 substrings for s = c log 1δ in fully adversarial
setting is again 1− exp (−Θ (nδ log(1/δ))).
Theorem 3.7 and Lemma 3.10 allow us to conclude that one can perform the simulation stated
in Theorem 3.7 over any interactive protocol with high probability (see Theorem 3.11).
Theorem 3.11. Suppose that n rounds of a binary interactive insertion-deletion channel with
a δ fraction of insertions and deletions performed by a non-oblivious adversary are given. For a
sufficiently small δ, it is possible to simulate n
(
1−Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
))
rounds of a binary interactive(
Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
)
,
√
log 1/δ
δ
)
-block corruption channel between two parties, Alice and Bob, over the
given channel. The simulation is efficient if the synchronization string is efficient and works with
probability 1− exp (−Θ (nδ log(1/δ))).
3.4 Binary One Way Communication
It is trivial to simplify Algorithms 4 and 5 from Section 3 to prove our simulation guarantees over
binary alphabets. Specifically, the messages that Bob sends may be completely ignored and thereby
we immediately obtain the following result for one-way insertion-deletion channels:
Theorem 3.12. Suppose that n rounds of a binary one-way insertion-deletion channel with a δ
fraction of insertions and deletions are given. For a sufficiently small δ, it is possible to determin-
istically simulate n
(
1−Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
))
rounds of a binary(
Θ
(√
δ log
1
δ
)
,
√
log(1/δ)
δ
)
one-way block corruption channel between two parties, Alice and Bob, over the given channel as-
suming that all substrings of form 10s−1 for s = c log 1δ in Alice’s stream of bits can be covered
by nδ intervals of
√
log(1/δ)
δ consecutive rounds. This simulation is performed efficiently if the
synchronization string is efficient.
Further, one can use the pre-coding technique introduced in Lemma 3.8 and Theorem 3.12 to
show that:
Theorem 3.13. Suppose that n rounds of a binary one-way insertion-deletion channel with a
δ fraction of insertions and deletions are given. For sufficiently small δ, it is possible to sim-
ulate n
(
1−Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
))
rounds of a binary
(
Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
)
,
√
log 1/δ
δ
)
block corruption
channel between two parties, Alice and Bob, over the given channel. The simulation works with
probability 1− e−Θ(nδ log(1/δ)), and is efficient if the synchronization string is efficient.
4 Applications: Binary Insertion-Deletion Codes
The binary one-way simulation in Theorem 3.13 suggests a natural way to overcome insertion-
deletion errors in one-way binary channels. One can simply simulate the corruption channel and
use appropriate corruption-channel error correcting codes on top of the simulated channel to make
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the communication resilient to insertion-deletion errors. However, as the simulation works with
high probability, this scheme is not deterministic.
As preserving the streaming quality is not necessary for the sake of designing binary insertion-
deletion codes, we can design a deterministic pre-coding and error correcting code that can be used
along with the deterministic simulation introduced in Theorem 3.12 to generate binary insertion-
deletion codes.
Lemma 4.1. There exist error correcting codes for
(
Θ
(√
δ log(1/δ)
)
,
√
log(1/δ)/δ
)
block cor-
ruption channels with rate 1−Θ(√δ log(1/δ))− δc/2 whose codewords are guaranteed to be free of
substrings of form 10s−1 for c log 1δ .
Proof. Assume that we are sending n bits over a
(pb, rb) =
(
Θ
(√
δ log
1
δ
)
,
√
log(1/δ)
δ
)
block corruption channel. Let us chop the stream of bits into blocks of size rb. Clearly, the
fraction of blocks which may contain any errors is at most 2pb. Therefore, by looking at each block
as a symbol from a large alphabet of size 2rb , one can protect them against 2pb fraction of errors
by having Θ(H2rb (2pb) + pb) fraction of redundant blocks.
In the next step, we propose a way to efficiently transform each block of length rb of the encoded
string into a block of rb(1 + δ
c/2) bits so that the resulting stream of bits be guaranteed not to
contain 10s−1 substrings.
To do so, we think of each block of length rb as a number in the range of zero to 2
rb − 1. Then,
we can represent this number in 2s/2−1 base and then map each of the symbols of this presentation
to strings of s2 bits except the
s
2 all-zero string. This way, one can efficiently code the string into a
stream of bits free of 10s−1 substrings by losing a 2−s/2-fraction of bits.
On the other side of the channel, Bob has to split the stream he receives into blocks of length
s
2 , undo the map to find out a possibly corrupted version of the originally encoded message and
then decode the 2rb-sized alphabet error correcting code to extract Alice’s message.
This introduces an insertion-deletion code with rate of 1 − Θ(H2rb (2pb) + pb) − 2−s/2. As
s = c log 1δ , 2
−s/2 = δc/2, pb =
√
δ log 1δ , and
H2rb (2pb) = Θ(2pb log2rb (1/2pb)) = Θ
(
2pb log2(1/2pb)
rb
)
= Θ

√
δ log 1δ log
1
δ√
log(1/δ)
δ
 = Θ(δ log 1
δ
)
the proof is complete.
One can set c ≥ 1 and then apply such error correcting codes on top of a simulated channel as
described in Theorem 3.12 to construct a binary insertion-deletion code resilient to δ fraction of
insertions and deletions with rate 1−Θ
(√
δ log 1δ
)
for a sufficiently small δ.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a constant 0 < δ0 < 1 such that for any 0 < δ < δ0 there is a binary
insertion-deletion code with rate 1−Θ
(√
δ log 1δ
)
which is decodable from δ fraction of insertions
and deletions.
In comparison to the previously known binary insertion-deletion codes [17,29], this code has an
improved rate-distance trade-off up to logarithmic factors.
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5 Applications: New Interactive Coding Schemes
Efficient Coding Scheme Tolerating 1/44 Fraction of Errors. In this section, we will provide
an efficient coding scheme for interactive communication over insertion-deletion channels by first
making use of large alphabet interactive channel simulation provided in Theorem 3.5 to effectively
transform the given channel into a simple corruption interactive channel and then use the efficient
constant-rate coding scheme of Ghaffari and Haeupler [15] on top of the simulated channel. This
will give an efficient constant-rate interactive communication over large enough constant alphabets
as described in Theorem 1.2. We review the following theorem of Ghaffari and Haeupler [15] before
proving Theorem 1.2.
Theorem 5.1 (Theorem 1.1 from [15]). For any constant ε > 0 and n-round protocol Π there is a
randomized non-adaptive coding scheme that robustly simulates Π against an adversarial error rate
of ρ ≤ 1/4 − ε using N = O(n) rounds, a near-linear n logO(1) n computational complexity, and
failure probability 2−Θ(n).
Proof of Theorem 1.2. For a given insertion-deletion interactive channel over alphabet Σ suffering
from δ fraction of edit-corruption errors, Theorem 3.5 enables us to simulate n−2nδ(1+(1−ε′)−1)
rounds of ordinary interactive channel with 2δ(5−3ε
′)
1−ε′+2ε′δ−4δ fraction of symbol by designating log |Σsyn|
bits of each symbol to index simulated channel’s symbols with an ε′-synchronization string over
Σsyn.
One can employ the scheme of Ghaffari and Haeupler [15] over the simulated channel as long
as error fraction is smaller than 1/4. Note that 2δ(5−3ε
′)
1−ε′+2δε′−4δ
∣∣∣
ε′=0
= 10δ1−4δ <
1
4 ⇔ δ < 144 . Hence,
as long as δ = 1/44 − ε for ε > 0, for small enough ε′ = Oε(1), the simulated channel has
an error fraction that is smaller than 1/4. Therefore, by running the efficient coding scheme
of Theorem 5.1 over this simulated channel one gets a constant rate coding scheme for interactive
communication that is robust against 1/44−ε fraction of edit-corruptions. Note that this simulation
requires the alphabet size to be large enough to contain synchronization symbols (which can come
from a polynomially large alphabet in terms of ε′ according to Lemma 2.6) and also meet the
alphabet size requirements of Theorem 5.1. This requires the alphabet size to be Ωε(1), i.e., a large
enough constant merely depending on ε. The success probability and time complexity are direct
consequences of Theorem 5.1 and Theorem 2.8.
Efficient Coding Scheme with Near-Optimal Rate over Small Alphabets. In this section
we present another insertion-deletion interactive coding scheme that achieves near-optimal com-
munication efficiency as well as computation efficiency by employing a similar idea as in Section 5.
In order to derive a rate-efficient interactive communication coding scheme over small alphabet
insertion-deletion channels, Algorithms 4 and 5 can be used to simulate a corruption channel and
then the rate-efficient interactive coding scheme for corruption channels introduced by Haeupler [19]
can be used on top of the simulated channel.
We start by a quick review of Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 of Haeupler [19].
Theorem 5.2 (Theorem 7.1 from [19]). Suppose any n-round protocol Π using any alphabet Σ.
Algorithm 3 [from [19]] is a computationally efficient randomized coding scheme which given Π,
with probability 1− 2−Θ(nδ), robustly simulates it over any oblivious adversarial error channel with
alphabet Σ and error rate δ. The simulation uses n(1 + Θ(
√
δ)) rounds and therefore achieves a
communication rate of 1−Θ(√δ).
Theorem 5.3 (Theorem 7.2 from [19]). Suppose any n-round protocol Π using any alphabet Σ.
Algorithm 4 [from [19]] is a computationally efficient randomized coding scheme which given Π, with
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probability 1− 2−Θ(nδ), robustly simulates it over any fully adversarial error channel with alphabet
Σ and error rate δ. The simulation uses n(1 + Θ
(√
δ log log 1δ
)
rounds and therefore achieves a
communication rate of 1−Θ
(√
δ log log 1δ
)
.
The interaction between the error rate and rate loss provided in Theorems 5.2 and 5.3 (Theorems
7.1 and 7.2 of [19]) leads us to the following corollary.
Corollary 5.4. There are high-probability efficient coding schemes for interactive communication
over insertion-deletion channels that are robust against δ fraction of edit-corruptions for sufficiently
small δ and have communication rate of 1 − Θ
(
4
√
δ log 1δ
)
against oblivious adversaries and 1 −
Θ
(
4
√
δ log 1δ log
2 log 1δ
)
in fully adversarial setup.
However, these results can be improved upon by taking a closer look at the specifics of the
interactive communication coding scheme in [19].
In a nutshell, the interactive coding scheme proposed in [19] simulates an interactive protocol
Π by splitting the communication into iterations. In each iteration, the coding scheme lets Alice
and Bob communicate for a block of r¯ rounds, then uses rc rounds of communication after each
block so the parties can verify if they are on the same page and then decide whether to continue
the communication or to roll back the communication for some number of iterations. The parties
perform this verification by exchanging a fingerprint (hash) of their versions of the transcript. Next,
each party checks if the fingerprint he receives matches his own, which in turn identifies whether
the parties agree or disagree about the communication transcript. Based on the result of this check,
each party decides if he should continue the communication from the point he is already at or if he
should roll back the communication for some number of iterations and continue from there. (see
Algorithms 3 and 4 of [19])
The analysis in Section 7 of Heaupler [19] introduces a potential function Φ which increases by
at least one whenever a round of communication is free of any errors or hash collisions. A hash
collision occurs if the parties’ transcripts do not agree due to errors that occurred previously, yet
the two parties’ fingerprints erroneously match. The analysis also shows that whenever a round
of communication contains errors or hash collisions, regardless of the number of errors or hash
collisions happening in a round, the potential drops by at most a fixed constant. (Lemmas 7.3 and
7.4 of [19])
For an error rate of δ¯, there can be at most nδ¯ rounds suffering from an error. Haeupler [19]
shows that the number of hash collisions can also be bounded by Θ(nδ¯) with exponentially high
probability. (Lemmas 7.6 and 7.7 and Corollary 7.8 of [19]) Given that the number of errors and
hash collisions is bounded by Θ(nδ¯), Haeupler [19] shows that if Φ > nr¯ + Θ(nδ¯), then the two
parties will agree on the first n steps of communication and therefore the communication will be
simulated thoroughly and correctly. Therefore, after nr¯ + Θ(nδ¯) rounds the simulation is complete,
and the rate of this simulation is 1−Θ (rδ¯ + rcr¯ ).
Theorem 5.5 (Interactive Coding against Block Corruption). By choosing an appropriate block
length in the Haeupler [19] coding scheme for oblivious adversaries (Theorem 5.2), one obtains a
robust efficient interactive coding scheme for (δb, rb)-block corruption channel with communication
rate 1−Θ(√δb max {δb, 1/rb}) that works with probability 1− 2−Θ(nδb/rb).
Proof. Let us run Haeupler [19] scheme with block size r¯. This way, each block of corruption that
rises in channel, may corrupt max
{
rb
r¯ , 1
}
blocks of Haeupler [19] scheme. Therefore, the total
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number of corrupted blocks in Haeupler [19] scheme can be:
nδb
rb
max
{rb
r¯
, 1
}
Therefore, the total fraction of Haeupler [19] scheme’s blocks containing errors is at most
δ¯ = δb max
{
1,
r¯
rb
}
For oblivious adversaries, Haeupler [19] suggests a verification process which can be performed
in rc = Θ(1) steps at the end of each round. We use the exact same procedure. Lemma 7.6 of [19]
directly guarantees that the fraction of hash collisions using this procedure is upper-bounded by
Θ(δ¯) with probability 1−2−Θ(nδ¯/r¯). As the fraction of blocks suffering from hash collisions or errors
is at most Θ(δ¯), the communication can be shown to be complete in (1 + δ¯) multiplicative factor
of rounds by the same potential argument as in [19].
Therefore, the rate lost in this interactive coding scheme is
Θ
(
δ¯ +
rc
r¯
)
= Θ
(
δb max
{
1,
r¯
rb
}
+
1
r¯
)
Now, the only remaining task is to find r¯ that minimizes the rate loss mentioned above. If we
choose r¯ ≤ rb, the best choice is r¯ = rb as it reduces the rate to δb + 1rb . On the other hand if we
choose r¯ ≥ rb, the optimal choice is r¯ =
√
rb
δb
if
√
rb
δb
≥ rb ⇔ rb ≤ 1δb or r¯ = rb otherwise. Hence,
we set
r¯ =
{ √
rb
δb
if rb ≤ 1δb
rb rb >
1
δb
Plugging this values for r¯ gives that:
Rate =
{
1−Θ
(√
δb
rb
)
rb ≤ 1δb
1−Θ (δb) rb > 1δb
= 1−Θ
(√
δb max
{
δb,
1
rb
})
Also, the probability of this coding working correctly is:
1− 2−Θ(nδ¯/r¯) = 1− 2−δb max
{
1
r¯
, 1
rb
}
=
{
1− 2−δb max
{√
δb
rb
, 1
rb
}
rb ≤ 1δb
1− 2−δb max
{
1
rb
, 1
rb
}
rb >
1
δb
= 1− 2−Θ(
δb
rb
n)
Applying the coding scheme of Theorem 5.5 over the simulation from Theorem 3.9 implies the
following.
Theorem 5.6. For sufficiently small δ, there is an efficient interactive coding scheme over binary
insertion-deletion channels which, is robust against δ fraction of edit-corruptions by an oblivious
adversary, achieves a communication rate of 1 − Θ(√δ log(1/δ)), and works with probability 1 −
2−Θ(nδ).
Moreover, we show that this result is extendable for the fully adversarial setup, as summarized
in Theorem 1.3.
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Proof of Theorem 1.3. Similar to the proofs of Theorems 5.5 and 5.6, we use the simulation dis-
cussed in Theorem 3.11 and coding structure introduced in Haeupler [19] with rounds of length
r¯ =
√
log(1/δ)
δ on top of that. However, this time, we use another verification strategy with length
of rc = log log
1
δ which is used in Haeupler [19] as a verification procedure in the interactive coding
scheme for fully adversarial channels.
The idea of this proof, similar to the proof of Theorem 5.5, is to show that the number of rounds
suffering from errors or hash collisions can be bounded by Θ(nδ) with high probability and then
apply the same potential function argument. All of the steps of this proof are, like their analogs in
Theorem 5.5, implications of Haeupler [19], except for the fact that the number of hash collisions
can be bounded by Θ(nδ). This is because of the fact that the entire Haeupler [19] analysis, except
Lemma 7.7 that bounds hash collisions, are merely based on the fact that all but O(nδ) rounds are
error free.
Therefore, if we show that the number of hash collisions in the fully adversarial case is bounded
by Θ(nδ), the simulation rate will be
1−
(
Θ(nδ)
n/r
+
rc
r¯
)
= 1−Θ
√ log(1/δ)
δ
· δ + log log
1
δ√
log(1/δ)
δ
 = 1−Θ(√δ log 1
δ
)
and the proof will be complete.
We now bound the number of hash collisions in our interactive coding scheme. The verification
process for fully adversarial setting uses a two level hash function hash2(hash1(·)), where the seed
of hash1 is randomly generated in each round.
Lemma 7.7 of Haeupler [19] implies that for any oblivious adversary, the number of hash colli-
sions due to hash1 is at most Θ(nδ) with probability 1− δΘ(nδ). To find a similar bound for non-
oblivious adversaries, we count the number of all possible oblivious adversaries and then use a union
bound. The number of oblivious adversaries is shown to be less than
(
3e
δ
)nδ
= enδ log(1/δ)(1+o(1)) in
Lemma 3.10. Hence, the probability of having more than Θ(nδ) hash1 hash collisions in any fully
adversarial scenario is at most 2−Θ(nδ). Now, Corollary 7.8 of Haeupler [19] can be directly applied
to show that the number of hash2 hash collisions can also be bounded by Θ(nδ) with probability
1− 2−Θ(nδ). This completes the proof.
This insertion-deletion interactive coding scheme is, to the best of our knowledge, the first
to be computationally efficient, to have communication rate approaching one, and to work over
arbitrarily small alphabets.
6 Synchronization Strings and Edit-Distance Tree Codes
We start by providing a new upper bound on the error tolerance of Braverman et al.’s coding
scheme for interactive communication with a large alphabet over a insertion-deletion channel [8].
We tweak the definition of edit-distance tree codes, the primary tool that Braverman et al. use in
their coding scheme. In doing so, we show that their scheme has an error tolerance of 1/10 − ε
rather than 1/18 − ε, which is the upper bound provided by Braverman et al. In particular, we
prove the following theorem, which is a restatement of Theorem 1.4 from Braverman et al.’s work
except for the revised error tolerance. The proof can be found in Section 6.1.
Theorem 6.1. For any ε > 0, and for any binary (noiseless) protocol Π with communication
CC(Π), there exists a noise-resilient coding scheme with communication Oε(CC(Π)) that succeeds
in simulating Π as long as the adversarial edit-corruption rate is at most 1/10− ε.
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We then review the definition and key characteristics of edit-distance tree codes and discuss the
close relationship between edit-distance tree codes and synchronization strings using the revised
definition of edit-distance tree codes.
6.1 Revised definition of edit-distance tree codes
Before proceeding to the definition of edit-distance tree codes, we begin with some definitions.
Definition 6.2 (Prefix Code, Definition 3.1 of [8]). A prefix code C : Σnin → Σnout is a code such
that C(x)[i] only depends on x[1, i]. C can also be considered as a |Σin|-ary tree of depth n with
symbols written on edges of the tree using the alphabet Σout. On this tree, each tree path from the
root of length l corresponds to a string x ∈ Σlout and the symbol written on the deepest edge of this
path corresponds to C(x)[l].
Definition 6.3 (ε-bad Lambda, Revision of Definition 3.2 of [8]). We say that a prefix code C
contains an ε-bad lambda if when this prefix code is represented as a tree, there exist four tree nodes
A,B,D,E such that B 6= D, B 6= E, B is D and E’s common ancestor, A is B’s ancestor or B
itself, and ED(AD,BE) ≤ (1− ε) · (|AD|+ |BE|).2 Here AD and BE are strings of symbols along
the tree path from A to D and the tree path from B to E. See Figure 2 for an illustration.
Definition 6.4 (Edit-distance Tree Code, Definition 3.3 of [8]). We say that a prefix code C :
Σnin → Σnout is an ε-edit-distance tree code if C does not contain an ε-bad lambda.
Using this revised definition of edit-distance tree code, we prove Theorem 6.1 as follows:
Proof of Theorem 6.1. We relax Braverman et al.’s definition of an edit-distance tree code [8], which
is an adaptation of Schulman’s original tree codes [26]. Edit-distance tree codes are parameterized
by a real value ε, and Braverman et al. define an ε-edit-distance tree code to be a prefix code
C : Σnin → Σnout that does not contain what they refer to as an ε-bad lambda. The code C
contains an ε-bad lambda if when one considers C as a tree, there exist four tree nodes A,B,D,E
such that B 6= D, B 6= E, B is D and Es common ancestor, A is Bs ancestor or B itself, and
ED(AD,BE) ≤ (1 − ε) · max(|AD|, |BE|). Here AD and BE are strings of symbols along the
tree path from A to D and the tree path from B to E. See Figure 2 for an illustration. We
relax the definition of an ε-bad lambda to be any four tree nodes A,B,D,E as above such that
ED(AD,BE) ≤ (1− ε) · (|AD|+ |BE|).
We use synchronization strings together with Schulman’s original tree codes to prove that edit-
distance tree codes, under this revised definition, exist. In particular, in Theorem 6.9, we show that
synchronization strings can be concatenated with tree codes to produce edit-distance tree codes.
Given that tree codes and synchronization strings exist, this means that edit-distance tree codes
according to our revised definition exist.
As we saw in Lemma 6.6, if C : Σnin → Σnout is an ε-edit-distance tree code and c˜ ∈ Σmout,
then there exists at most one c ∈ ∪ni=1C (Σnin) [1, i] such that SD(c, c˜) ≤ 1 − ε. This leads to an
improved version of Lemma 4.2 from Braverman et al.’s work, which we describe after we set up
notation. In Braverman et al.’s protocol, let NA and NB be the number of messages Alice and
Bob have sent when one of them reaches the end of the protocol. Let sA and rA be the messages
Alice has sent and received over the course of the protocol, and let sB and rB be the messages
Bob has sent and received over the course of the protocol. Let τA = (τ1, τ2) be the string matching
between sB[1, NB] and rA[1, NA] and let τB = (τ3, τ4) be the string matching between sA[1, NA]
and rB[1, NB]. Braverman et al. call a given round a good decoding if Alice correctly decodes the
2Braverman et al. say that A,B,D,E form an ε-bad lambda if ED(AD,BE) ≤ (1− ε) ·max(|AD|, |BE|).
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entire set of tree code edges sent by Bob. Lemma 6.6 admits the following improved version of
Lemma 4.2 from Braverman et al’s work:
Lemma 6.5 (Revision of Lemma 4.2 from [8]). Alice has at least NA+
(
1− 11−ε
)
sc(τ2)−
(
1 + 11−ε
)
sc(τ1)
good decodings. Bob has at least NB +
(
1− 11−ε
)
sc(τ4)−
(
1 + 11−ε
)
sc(τ3) good decodings.
The proof of this revised lemma follows the exact same logic as the proof of Lemma 4.2 in
Braverman et al.’s work. The theorem statement now follows the same logic as the proof of Theorem
4.4 in Braverman et al.’s work. We include the revised section of the proof below, where the only
changes are the maximum error tolerance ρ, the value of n (which is smaller by a factor of 12), and
several equations. We set ρ = 110 − ε and n = d T8εe, where T is the length of the original protocol.
Let gA be the number of good decodings of Alice and bA = NA−gA be the number of bad decodings
of Alice. Similarly, let gB be the number of good decodings of Bob and bB = NB−gB be the number
of bad decodings of Bob. In Braverman et al.’s protocol, Alice and Bob share an edit-distance tree
code C : Σnin → Σnout. By definition of edit distance, sc(τ1) + sc(τ3) = sc(τ2) + sc(τ4) ≤ 2ρn. By
Lemma 6.5,
bA + bB ≤ 1
1− ε(sc(τ1) + sc(τ2)) + sc(τ1)− sc(τ2) +
1
1− ε(sc(τ3) + sc(τ4)) + sc(τ3)− sc(τ4)
≤ 4ρn
1− ε.
Therefore,
gA = NA − bA ≥ NA − 4ρn
1− ε = (NA − n(1− 2ρ) + n(1− 2ρ) + n(1− 2ρ)−
4ρn
1− ε
≥ bA + bB − 4ρn
1− ε + (NA − n(1− 2ρ)) + n(1− 2ρ)−
4ρn
1− ε
= bA + bB + (NA − n(1− 2ρ)) + n
(
1− 8ρ
1− ε − 2ρ
)
≥ bA + bB + (NA − n(1− 2ρ)) + n
(
1− 8ρ
1− ε − 2ρ
)
≥ bA + bB + (NA − n(1− 2ρ)) + 8εn ≥ bA + bB + (NA − n(1− 2ρ)) + T.
The remainder of the proof follows exactly as is the proof of Theorem 4.4 from Braverman et al.’s
work.
Suppose that Alice uses an ε-edit-distance tree code C : Σnin → Σnout to send a message c to
Bob. In the following theorem, we show that if SD(c, c˜) < 1 − ε, then Bob can decode Alice’s
message. Braverman et al. proved a weaker version of this theorem [8], but our revised definition
of an edit-distance tree code easily admits the follow lemma.
Lemma 6.6 (Revision of Lemma 3.10 from [8]). Let C : Σnin → Σnout be an ε-edit-distance tree
code, and let c˜ ∈ Σmout. There exists at most one c ∈ ∪ni=1C (Σnin) [1, i] such that SD(c, c˜) ≤ 1− ε.
Proof. The proof follows exactly the same logic as the proof of Lemma 3.10 from [8]. The proof
begins by assuming, for a contradiction, that there exist two messages c, c′ ∈ ∪ni=1C (Σnin) [1, i] such
that both SD(c, c˜) ≤ (1− ε) and SD(c′, c˜) ≤ (1− ε). Then, the proof reaches its conclusion by the
exact same logic.
In Theorem 6.13, we will show that one can extend an ε-synchronization string S to a (2ε−ε2)-
edit-distance tree code. This implies the following corollary of Lemma 6.6.
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Corollary 6.7. Let S ∈ Σn be an ε-synchronization string, and c ∈ Σm. There exists at most one
prefix c˜ of S for which SD(c, c˜) ≤ (1− ε)2.
6.2 Edit-distance tree codes and synchronization strings
We prove that under the revised definition, edit-distance tree codes still exist by relating edit-
distance tree codes to Schulman’s original tree codes. We introduce a method to obtain an edit-
distance tree code using ordinary tree codes and synchronization strings. Intuitively, using syn-
chronization strings and tree codes together, one can overcome the synchronization problem using
the synchronization string and then overcome the rest of the decoding challenges using tree codes,
which are standard tools for overcoming corruption errors. Tree codes are defined as follows.
Definition 6.8 (Tree Codes, from [27]). A d-ary tree code over an alphabet Σ of distance parameter
α and depth n is a d-ary tree of depth n in which every arc of the tree is labeled with a character
from the alphabet Σ subject to the following condition. Let v1 and v2 be any two nodes at some
common depth h in the tree. Let h− l be the depth of their least common ancestor. Let W (v1) and
W (v2) be the concatenation of the letters on the arcs leading from the root to v1 and v2 respectively.
Then ∆(W (v1),W (v2)) ≥ αl.
Schulman [26,27] proved that for any α < 1, there exists a d-ary tree code with distance α and
infinite depth over an alphabet of size (cd)1/(1−α), for some constant c < 6. We now prove that
edit-distance tree codes can be obtained using synchronization strings and tree codes.
Theorem 6.9. Let T be a tree code of depth n and distance parameter (1− α) and let S be an
ε-synchronization string of length n. Let the tree T ′ be obtained by concatenating all edges on ith
level of T with S[i]. Then T ′ is a (1− ε− α)-edit-distance tree code.
Proof. To prove that T ′ is a (1− ε− α)-edit-distance tree code, we show that T ′ does not contain
any (1− ε− α)-bad lambdas. Let A,B,D, and E be nodes in T ′ that form a lambda structure.
We refer to the string consisting of edge labels on the path from node A to D by AD and
similarly we refer to the string consisting of labels on the path from B to E by BE. Let τ be
the string matching characterizing the edit distance of AD and BE. We call i a matching position
if τ1[i] = τ2[i]. Further, we call i a same-level matching position if τ1[i] and τ2[i] correspond to
symbols on the same level edges and disparate-level matching position otherwise.
By the definition of a tree code, the number of same-level matching positions is at most
αmin {|BD|, |BE|} ≤ α(|AD|+ |BE|).
Further, Haeupler and Shahrasbi prove that for any monotone matching between an ε-synchronization
string and itself, i.e. a set of pairs M = {(a1, b1) , . . . , (am, bm)} where a1 < · · · < am, b1 < · · · bm,
and S [ai] = S [bi], the number of pairs where ai 6= bi is at most ε|S| [21]. This means that the
number of disparate-level matching positions is at most ε(|AD|+ |BE|). Therefore,
ED(AD,BE) ≥ |AD|+ |BE| − ε(|AD|+ |BE|)− α(|AD|+ |BE|)
≥ (1− ε− α)(|AD|+ |BE|).
Note that Theorem 6.9 suggests a construction for edit-distance tree codes by simply construct-
ing and concatenating an ordinary tree code and a synchronization string. As synchronization
strings are efficiently constructible and tree codes can be constructed in sub-exponential time [6,28],
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𝐷 
Figure 2: (A,B,D,E) form a Lambda structure.
this construction runs in sub-exponential time which improves over the construction of edit-distance
tree codes from Braverman et al. [8].
The following theorems discuss further connections between synchronization strings and edit-
distance tree codes. Theorems 6.11 and 6.13 show that edit-distance tree codes and synchronization
strings are essentially similar combinatorial objects. In Theorem 6.11, we show that the edge labels
along a monotonically down-going path in an edit-distance tree code form a synchronization string
as though, in a manner, synchronization strings are one dimensional edit-distance tree codes. On
the other hand, in Theorem 6.13, we show that for any synchronization string S, there is an
edit-distance tree code that has S on one of its monotonically down-going paths.
Lemma 6.10. In an ε-edit-distance tree code, for every three vertices X, Y , and Z where X is an
ancestor of Y and Y is an ancestor of Z, we have that ED(XY, Y Z) ≥
(
1− ε− 1|XZ|
)
|XZ|.
Proof. To show this, we set A = X,B = Y,E = Z and denote the child of Y which is not
in the path from Y to Z by D (see Figure 2). Then A,B,D, and E form a lambda in the tree
(Definition 6.3). As ε-edit-distance tree codes are ε-bad lambda free, we know that ED(AD,BE) ≥
(1− ε) · (|AD|+ |BE|).
Note that ED(AD,BE) = ED(XD,Y Z) ≤ 1 + ED(XY, Y Z) and |AD| = |XY | + 1 > |XY |,
which means that ED(XY, Y Z) + 1 ≥ (1 − ε)|XZ|. Therefore, ED(XY, Y Z) ≥
(
1− ε− 1|XZ|
)
·
|XZ|.
Using this property, one can obtain synchronization strings using monotonically down-going
paths in a given edit-distance tree code as follows:
Theorem 6.11. Concatenating the symbols on any monotonically down-going path in an ε-edit-
distance tree code with a string consisting of repetitions of 1, 2, · · · , l gives an (ε+ 1l )-synchronization
string.
Proof. Consider three indices i < j < k in such string. If k − i < l, the (ε+ 1l )-synchronization
property holds as a result of the 1, · · · , l, · · · portion. Unless, the edit-distance path symbols satisfy(
ε+ 1l
)
-synchronization property as a result of Lemma 6.10.
Theorem 6.11 results into the following corollary:
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Corollary 6.12. Existence of synchronization strings over constant-sized alphabets can be implied
by Theorem 6.11 and the fact that edit-distance tree codes exist from [8]. However, the alphabet
size would be exponentially large in terms of 1ε .
Theorem 6.13. Any ε-synchronization string in Σn1 can be extended to a (2ε − ε2)-edit-distance
tree code C : Σin → (Σout ∪ Σ1)n using the ε-edit-distance tree code C ′ : (Σnin → Σnout) such that a
monotonically down-going path on C is labeled as S.
Proof. We simply replace the labels of edges on the rightmost path in the tree associated with C ′
to obtain C. We show that C is a valid (2ε − ε2)-edit-distance tree code. To prove this, we need
to verify that this tree does not contain an (2ε − ε2)-bad lambda structure. In this proof, we set
α = 1− (2ε− ε2) = (1− ε)2 and α′ = 1− ε.
Let A,B,D,E form a lambda structure in the corresponding tree of C. We will prove the claim
under two different cases:
• BE does not contain any edges from the rightmost path: Assume that AD contains
l edges from the rightmost path. In order to turn AD into BE, we must remove all l symbols
associated with the rightmost path since BE has no symbols from Σ1. Hence, ED(AD,BE)
is equal to l plus the edit distance of BE and AD after removal of those l edges. Note that
removing l elements in AD and then converting the remaining string (A˜D) to BE is also a
way of converting AD to BE in the original tree. Thus,
EDoriginal(AD,BE) ≤ l + ED(A˜D,BE) = EDmodified(AD +BE)
On the other hand, EDoriginal(AD,BE) ≥ α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|). Therefore,
EDmodified(AD,BE) ≥ α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|).
• BE contains some edges from the rightmost path: It must be that all of AB and a
non-empty prefix of BE, which we refer to as BX, both lie in the rightmost path in tree code
(Fig. 3). Since the symbols in the rightmost path are from the alphabet Σ1,
ED(AD,BE) = ED(AB,BX) + ED(BD,XE).
We consider the following two cases, where c is a constant we set later.
1. c · (|AB|+ |BX|) > |BD|+ |XE|:
In this case,
ED(AD,BE) = ED(AB,BX) + ED(BD,XE)
≥ ED(AB,BX)
≥ (1− ε) · (|AB|+ |BX|)
≥ 1− ε
c+ 1
· ((|AB|+ |BX|) + (|BD|+ |EX|))
≥ 1− ε
c+ 1
· (|AD|+ |BE|).
2. c · (|AB|+ |BX|) ≤ |BD|+ |XE|: Since (A,B,D,E) form a lambda structure,
EDoriginal(AD,BE) ≥ α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|)
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Figure 3: AD and BE both contain edges from the rightmost path. Straight lines represent the edges in the
rightmost path and dashed ones represent other edges.
and therefore,
EDmodified(AD,BE) ≥ EDmodified(BD,EX) + ED(AB,BX)
≥ [EDoriginal(AD,BE)− (|AB|+ |BX|)] + ED(AB,BX)
≥ α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|)− (|AB|+ |BX|) + (1− ε) · (|AB|+ |BX|)
= α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|)− ε(|AB|+ |BX|)
≥ α′ · (|AD|+ |BE|)− ε
c+ 1
(|AD|+ |BE|)
=
(
α′ − ε
c+ 1
)
(|AD|+ |BE|).
Hence:
ED(AD,BE) ≥ min
{
α′ − ε
c+ 1
,
1− ε
c+ 1
, α′
}
(|AD|+ |BE|)
As α′ = 1− ε, setting c = ε1−ε gives that
ED(AD,BE) ≥ (1− ε)2 · (|AD|+ |BE|)
which finishes the proof.
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